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INTRODUCTION
In the 1989 landmark decision, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,'
the United States Supreme Court first applied strict scrutiny review to
state and local minority set-aside programs. One year later, the Court
issued its decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission.2 In this ruling, the Court upheld the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") policies that gave preference to minority
broadcasters using a rational basis standard.3 In Metro Broadcasting,
the Court affirmed Congress' right to require that a certain number
or percentage of broadcasting licenses be set-aside for auction to
minorities, stating that the requirement served the important
governmental objective of "enhancing broadcast diversity."4  Ten
years before the Metro Broadcasting decision, the Court decided
Fullilove v. Klutznick,5 in which the Court upheld Congress' inclusion
of a ten percent set-aside for minority-owned businesses in the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977.6 In Fullilove, the Court explained
that "the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context
presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the
congressional objectives." 7
Throughout the period these three decisions were rendered-and
indeed up to the beginning of last year-the law regarding minority
business preferences seemed quite clear. When the preference was
established by state or local laws, the preference would be reviewed
under a strict scrutiny standard.' Preferences established by the
federal government, pursuant to a law enacted by Congress, however,
were not subject to such a demanding standard, and would be upheld
if the government had a rational basis for the policy establishing the
preference. 9
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
3. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
4. Id. at 566-67.
5. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
6. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980).
7. Id. at 473 (italics omitted).
8. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-95 (1989) (announcing that
state and local race-based programs are reviewed under strict scrutiny standard).
9. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483 (holding that Congress' unique remedial power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment supports use of less demanding standard, such as rational basis
review, in evaluating federal minority set-aside programs); see also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
563 (giving deference, under standard of rational basis review, to congressional programs that
employ benign racial classifications).
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In June of 1995, however, the Court dramatically changed the legal
landscape as it then existed. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,10
the Court held that Croson's strict scrutiny standard of review applied
to all federal minority set-aside programs in addition to state and local
programs." Indeed, the Court ruled that the strict scrutiny standard
should be applied to all federal programs in which race is a factor.
1 2
In its holding the Court stated:
[A]ll governmental action based on race-a group classification long
recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited ... should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed. These ideas have long been central to this
Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding benign
state and federal racial classifications to different standards does not
square with them. [A] free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality, should tolerate no retreat from the
principle that government may treat people differently because of
their race only for the most compelling reasons. Accordingly, we
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."3
Adarand's immediate result was to place most of the government's set-
aside programs under review; at least one has already been suspend-
ed. 4 In addition, all race-based programs, including affirmative
action employment programs, have been or currently are under
review. 5
Part I of this Article discusses the historical antecedents to Adarand;
Part II analyzes the decision itself. Part III examines federal programs
designed to assist small disadvantaged businesses16 and surveys the
10. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
11. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (citing Croson in
extending applicability of strict scrutiny standard to race-based federal subcontracting programs,
including those programs purportedly benign or remedial).
12. See U at 2113 (stating that all racial classifications, including those imposed by federal
government, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny standard).
13. Id. at 2113-14 (citations and quotations omitted).
14. See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text (summarizing Department of Defense's
suspension of its "rule of two" minority set-aside program after Adarand decision).
15. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text (commenting on current and proposed
changes issued by federal government in response to Adarand decision); see also infra notes 245-
46 and accompanying text (noting reevaluation and suspension of affirmative action programs
on state level).
16. In particular, thisArticle examines the "minority business enterprise" ("MBE") provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 which requires that, absent an administrative
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changes to these programs in the wake of Adarand. Finally, Part IV
discusses the increase in claims concerning federal contracting likely
to be brought in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the wake of
Adarand.
I. THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO ADARAND
In 1980, nine years before City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 7 the
Supreme Court addressed for the first time, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,'8
the constitutionality of a federal affirmative action program as a result
of a lawsuit challenging the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.19
This Act amended an older law, the Local Public Works Capital
Development and Investment Act of 1976,20 and authorized in-
creased monetary appropriations for state and local government
public work projects to minorities.2 ' In Fullilove,22 construction
contractors and subcontractors, through their associations, brought
suit to enjoin the implementation of section 103(f) (2) of the Public
Works Employment Act, a section referred to as "the minority
business enterprise" provision ("MBE").23
The MBE provision stated that "no grant shall be made under this
Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of
the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business
enterprises."24 The provision defined a minority business enterprise
as "a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority
group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51
per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group
members."25 The MBE provision also defined minority group
members as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
waiver, at least 10% of federal funds granted for public works projects must be used to acquire
services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by members of minority groups.
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6701).
17. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
18. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
19. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701).
20. Pub. L. No. 94-369,90 Stat. 999 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701), amended by Public
Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701).
21. See 91 Stat. at 117-18 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6707) (setting forth standards for
allocation of funds to state and local public works projects).
22. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
23. SeeFulliove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,453-55 (1980) (providing summary of complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of MBE provision).
24. 1d. at 454 (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
25. Id. (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
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Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."2" The
contractors in Fullilove argued that because they did not fall within the
definition of minority group members under the MBE provision, they
were excluded from certain government grants and hurt economical-
ly.27 Further, the contractors argued that such exclusion violated
their right to equal protection under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.2
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the MBE
provision because "the program does not mandate the allocation of
federal funds according to inflexible percentages solely based on race
or ethnicity."29 The Court stated:
[The] program was designed to ensure that, to the extent federal
funds were granted under the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procure-
ment practices that Congress had decided might result in perpetua-
tion of the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or
foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting
opportunities.3°
In analyzing the constitutionality of the MBE decision, the Fullilove
Court adopted a two-part test to be used for future guidance on the
issue of racial classification."1 The first step inquired "whether the
objectives of this legislation are within the power of Congress." 2 If
the legislation passes this part of the test, then courts must ask
"whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context
presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the
congressional objectives and does not violate the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.""8
Finding the Public Works Act of 1977 to be an exercise of
Congress' spending power, the Court went on to state that "Congress
has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance
by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative direc-
26. Id. at 459 (quoting Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
27. See id. at 455 (arguing that enforcement of 10% MBE requirement caused economic
injury to petitioners' businesses).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id.
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tives."3' Further, the Court asserted that it "has repeatedly upheld
against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to induce
governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal
policy.""5
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., the Court reviewed a plan
adopted by the Richmond City Council, the purpose of which
ostensibly was "to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the
opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our
society."36 The plan required prime contractors awarded construc-
tion contracts to set-aside thirty percent of the dollar amount of the
contract to minority businesses.3 Minorities were defined in the
plan as blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or
Aleuts.' The geographic scope of the plan was unlimited, allowing
qualified minority businesses anywhere in the United States to benefit
from the thirty percent set-aside. 9 The city would grant waivers of
the set-aside requirement only in exceptional circumstances in which
it had been shown that "every feasible attempt has been made to
comply" and "sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business
Enterprises ... are unavailable or unwilling to participate in the
contract to enable meeting the 30% MBE goal."'
In determining that remedial action was necessary, the City Council
compared the percentage of blacks in Richmond with the percentage
of prime construction contracts awarded to minority businesses." In
Croson, the Court rejected the minority set-aside policies of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, finding the city had presented no evidence of
identified discrimination,42 had "failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis
of race"43 and that a generalized assertion of past discrimination "has
no logical stopping point."' In reaching its decision, the Court held
34. Id. at 474.
35. Id.
36. City of Richmond v.J-A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1989).
37. Id. at 477.
38. Id. at 478.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 478-79.
41. Id. at 479-80.
42. Id. at 505.
43. Id.
44. Id at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986)); see also
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (quoting
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498) (reiterating that generalized societal discrimination, without more, does
not provide basis for imposing racially classified remedial measures).
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that the City's minority set-aside policies were to be subjected to "strict
scrutiny," the most stringent review standard utilized by the court.45
One year after Croson, the Court revisited the issues it had ad-
dressed ten years earlier in Fuiilove when it decided Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission." Metro Broadcasting in-
volved "a Fifth Amendment challenge to two race-based policies of the
Federal Communications Commission."47 In this 1990 decision, the
Court imposed "a lesser duty on the Federal Government than it does
on a State to afford equal protection of the laws."4"
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court tread carefully in order to distin-
guish its holding from Croson.49 The Court insisted that the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") minority ownership programs
were benign race-conscious measures that had been mandated by
Congress," even though they had not been remedial in nature and
had not been designed to compensate victims of past discrimina-
tion.5 Indeed, the Court held that the FCC was justified in giving
preferential treatment to minorities in both comparative proceedings
for new licenses52 and "distress sales" of radio stations that have lost
the right to hold a broadcasting license.5" Such policies, ruled the
Court, pass constitutional muster as long as they serve an important
governmental interest within the power of Congress, are substantially
related to the achievement of that interest, and do not "impose undue
burdens on nonminorities.
"54
In addressing the need for program variety and mixture, the Court
held that the FCC's minority ownership policy was a justified means
to the goal of achieving "broadcast diversity."55  The Court went on
45. Id. at 493.
46. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (considering constitutionality of government minority preference
policies).
47. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-12 (1995) (identifying
issues raised in Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-67).
48. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (internal quotations omitted) (stating that Court in Metro
Broadcasting abandoned principles enunciated in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954),
which held federal and state governments to same constitutional standard of equal protection,
by holding that benign federal racial classifications must survive only intermediate scrutiny).
49. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (discussing Croson decision).
50. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563 (explaining significance of congressional directive
of employing and promoting benign racial classifications).
51. See id. at 566 (stating that primary purpose of program is to promote programming
diversity rather than remedying racial inequities).
52. Id. at 597.
53. See id. at 598-600 (discussing dynamics of "distress sales" and minority ownership
program's effect on such sales).
54. Id. at 596-97 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)).
55. Id. at 567-68 ("[W]e conclude that the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at
the very least, an important governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the
Commission's minority ownership policies.").
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to distinguish Croson by noting that the question of congressional
action was not an issue in that case. 6 Instead, the Court in Metro
Broadcasting upheld Congress' right to require that a percentage of
broadcast licenses be set-aside for auction to minorities, holding that
"benign" federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate
scrutiny, "even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination."" Such classifications are constitutionally permissible
"to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives
within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. 5 8
II. THE ADARAND DECISION
In June 1995, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.59 In this decision, the Court mandated that
all racial classifications imposed by any federal, state or local
governmental entity, must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard.6" Under this standard, government utilization of such
classifications is constitutional only if the utilization is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.6 In an-
nouncing this standard for federal programs, the Court expressly
overruled two of its prior decisions, Fullilove v. Klutznick and Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.62 Adarand
imposed on federal government contracting the same standard of
scrutiny applied to state and local government programs as opposed
to the lesser standard employed in the earlier cases.63
The imposition of this strict scrutiny standard has major implica-
tions for federal government contractors and subcontractors. 64 For
example, the federal government has developed and applied over the
56. See id at 565 (finding that Croson does not "undermine" Court's rationale in applying
intermediate scrutiny to race-conscious federal programs).
57. Id. at 564.
58. Id. at 565.
59. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
60. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-14 (1995).
61. 1&. at 2113.
62. Id. (overruling Metro Broadcasting's use of intermediate scrutiny for congressionally-
mandated racial classifications); id, at 2117 (holding, "to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held
federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer control-
ling.").
63. See id. at 2117 (holding that federal racial classifications, like those of state and local
governments, must satisfy strict scrutiny to be constitutionally valid).
64. SeeJohn F. Harris & Kevin Merida, Ruling May Sharpen Debate on Preference Politics, WASH.
PosT, June 13, 1995, at A6 (discussing Adarand's impact on congressional decisions and
administrative policy regarding affirmative action).
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years an elaborate set of rules and programs to maximize the
participation of small disadvantaged businesses ("SDB") in federal
contracting.' . Contracts to SDBs and minority-owned businesses
through federal set-aside programs constituted $10.5 billion out of the
$179.4 billion in contracts awarded by the government in 1993.66 All
such programs now are under review to determine if they meet the
Adarand test.6 7  One program-the Defense Department's "rule of
two" set-aside program for small disadvantaged business-has already
been suspended.' The government, however, has asserted that it
has not abandoned the goals of these programs69 and is committed
to furthering them.71 Some agencies have already promulgated
revised rules in light of Adarand's strict scrutiny standard.
71
Adarand involved a relatively innocuous SDB subcontracting
program.72  It offered a modest bonus to prime contractors who
employed SDB subcontractors.' It did not impose a quota or
numerical goals for SDB subcontracts.74 The prime contractor could
comply with its contractual obligations even if it did not award any
subcontracts to SDBs.75
The main issue in Adarand was a $1 million-plus prime contract for
a Colorado highway construction project awarded in 1989.76 This
contract had been awarded to Mountain Gravel & Construction
Company, a small business contractor, by the Central Federal Lands
65. See infra part HI (discussing origin of affirmative action initiative in federal government
contracting and providing overview of current programs).
66. Harris & Merida, supra note 64, at A6.
67. Evaluation of Affir-mative Action Programs, Memorandum from The White House to
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (July 19, 1995), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 147, at S-45 (Aug. 1, 1995) [hereinafter White House Memo]; see also President
William Clinton, Remarks on Affirmative Action at The Rotunda of the National Archives and
Records Administration (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter President's Remarks].
68. See 60 Fed. Reg. 54,954 (1995) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. §§ 219.501 (S-70), 219.502-2-
70,219.502-4,219.504(b) (i), 219.506,219.508(e), 219.508-70,252.219-7002) (suspending portion
of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement which implements "rule of two" program
for small disadvantaged businesses).
69. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text (discussing proposals of Department of
Justice and Clinton Administration for maintaining affirmative action programs after Adarand).
70. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text (discussing Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Program's commitment to promotion of racial diversity in federal procurement).
71. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing Department of Defense's
proposed rule changes to its small disadvantaged business program).
72. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2103-04 (1995) (describing race-
based subcontracting program challenged by subcontractor).
73. See id. at 2104 (noting that program paid 10% of final subcontract price in excess of the
contract percentage goal, not to exceed 1.5% of original contract amount, to contractor who
awards subcontract to one certified disadvantaged business enterprise).
74. Id.
75. I&.
76. See id. at 2102 (discussing terms of bid).
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Highway Division ("CFLHD"), a part of the United States Department
of Transportation ("DOT")." Pursuant to section 502 of the Small
Business Act,7' the agency included a "Subcontracting Compensation
Clause" addressing the utilization of disadvantaged business enterpris-
es ("DBE") as subcontractors.79 The relevant portions of this clause,
as addressed by the Court, provide:
Monetary compensation is offered for awarding subcontracts to
small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals.
A small business concern will be considered a DBE after it has
been certified as such by the U.S. Small Business Administration or
any State Highway Agency. Certification by other Government
agencies, counties, or cities may be acceptable on an individual
basis provided the Contracting Officer has determined the
certifying agency has an acceptable and viable DBE certification
program. If the Contractor requests payment under this provision,
the Contractor shall furnish the engineer with acceptable evidence
of the subcontractor(s) DBE certification and shall furnish one
certified copy of the executed subcontract(s).
The Contractor will be paid an amount computed as follows:
1. If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10 percent of the
final amount of the approved DBE subcontract, not to exceed 1.5
percent of the original contract amount.
2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more DBEs, 10 percent
of the final amount of the approved DBE subcontracts, not to
exceed 2 percent of the original contract amount."0
Contracts awarded by DOT agencies are required to include the
Subcontracting Compensation Clause." In addition, the clause must
include the following statement: "'The contractor shall presume that
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be
disadvantaged. by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to
section 8 (a) of the Small Business Act."'8 2
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (1994). This provision mandates that federal agencies provide "the
maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns and small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." lI&
79. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103-04.
80. Id
81. See id. at 2102 (stating that federal law requires inclusion of subcontracting clauses
similar to one contained in DOT's contract).
82. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2), (3)).
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After award of the prime contract, Mountain Gravel solicited
subcontractor bids for the guardrail portion of the contract.3
Adarand Constructors, Inc., a Colorado-based highway construction
company specializing in guardrail work, submitted the low bid.84
Another company, Gonzales Construction Company, submitted a bid
for a higher dollar amount than Adarand's.1 Because Mountain
Gravel's contract included the Subcontracting Compensation Clause,
it would receive additional money if it subcontracted with companies
that were certified "as small businesses controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." 6 Gonzales Construction
was a certified DBE 7 and Adarand was not.8 Mountain Gravel
therefore subcontracted with Gonzales Construction, despite the fact
that Adarand's bid was lower.8" Indeed, "Mountain Gravel's Chief
Estimator ... submitted an affidavit stating that Mountain Gravel
would have accepted Adarand's bid, had it not been for the additional
payment it received by hiring Gonzales instead." 0
As a result of not receiving the subcontract, Adarand sued DOT,
claiming that section 502 of the Small Business Act, which authorized
the subcontracting compensation clause, was unconstitutional.91 The
basis of Adarand's claim was that the statute discriminated "on the
basis of race in violation of the Federal Government's Fifth Amend-
ment obligation not to deny anyone equal protection of the laws. 9 2
The statute at issue, the Small Business Act,9" declares that it is "the
policy of the United States that small business concerns, [and] small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals, ... shall have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any
Federal agency."94 Further, the Small Business Act "defines socially
disadvantaged individuals as those who have been subjected to racial
or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
87. The Court noted that the record did not disdose how Gonzales had obtained its
certification as a small disadvantaged business. Id. at 2104.
88. IM. at 2102.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2104.
92. Id. at 2102.
93. Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631
(1994)).
94. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1)).
1914
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member of a group without regard to their individual qualities."9 5
The Act defines "economically disadvantaged individuals as those
socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free
enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and
credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area
who are not socially disadvantaged."96 The Act also states that in
order to further the policy of the United States with regard to SDBs,
it is "[t]he Government-wide goal [to have] participation by small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals of not less than [five] percent of the total
value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal
year."97 In addition, the head of each federal agency is required "to
set agency-specific goals for participation by businesses controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." s
Adarand claimed that the statute not only violated the "Fifth
Amendment obligation not to deny anyone equal protection of the
laws,"'99 but, specifically, it violated Adarand's Fifth Amendment right
to receive equal treatment under the law."°° Adarand lost its case
in both the Federal District Court of Colorado and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals."°1 The Supreme Court reversed both lower
courts.
10 2
In Adarand, the Court "alter[ed] the playing field in some impor-
tant respects"103 by requiring that the standard of scrutiny applied
to state and local contracting in Croson now be applied to contracting
with the federal government."° Indeed, the Court mandated that
all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.
0 5
95. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (5)).
96. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (6) (A)).
97. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (1)).
98. Id, (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (1)).
99. Id.
100. IL
101. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992)
(holding that DBE subcontracting program does notviolate Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments),
affid sub noma. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), reo'd, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995).
102. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
103. Id. at 2118.
104. Id. at 2113-18 (announcing that all race-based classifications, state and federal, will be
subject to strict scrutiny and explaining how holding departs from Fulilove and Metro
Broadcasting).
105. Id. at 2113.
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Although the decision established a higher level of scrutiny for small
disadvantaged or minority set-aside programs at the federal level, the
Court expressly stated that it did not intend to eliminate affirmative
action programs in government contracting.106  As Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
[The Court] wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality,
and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.
When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such
action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.
1 17
Justice O'Connor also gave some hope to the Small Business
Administration's ("SBA") "8(a) Program" by suggesting that con-
tractors' qualifications as socially and economically disadvantaged
under the 8(a) Program are individually evaluated and determined,
unlike the DBE contractors under the DOT program involved in
Adarand
108
Justice Scalia, however, in his concurring opinion did not offer such
'hope to the 8(a) program. Instead, Justice Scalia advocated a more
narrow approach than the majority opinion, arguing that the
government can never find a compelling interest for race-based
classifications designed to remedy past discrimination. 109  He
explained:
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimina-
tion should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can
be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That
concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual, and
its rejection of dispositions based on race, or based on blood. To
pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes--is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
106. See id at 2117 (explaining that purpose of strict scrutiny standard is not to preclude
affirmative action but to "ensure that courts will consistently give racial classifications that kind
of detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means").
107. Id at 2117 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor added that
"[a]s recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety's 'pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct'
justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy." Id. (quoting United States v. Paradise, 488 U.S.
149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
108. See id. at 2118 (noting several distinctions among government regulatory schemes
dealing with economically disadvantaged individuals).
109. I& (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
520 (1989) (Scaia,J., concurring)).
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privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just
one race here. It is American.
It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program
would survive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am
content to leave that to be decided on remand.110
Justice Scalia, of course, although an essential vote in the Adarand
majority, was (and is) but a single voice in his views.
The Adarand decision dramatically altered the law of affirmative
action-indeed so significantly that for almost a year, the federal
Government was silent as to its intentions. Finally, on May 23, 1996,
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued its "Proposed Reforms to
Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement," discussed below, in which
DOJ attempts to reconcile federal affirmative action policies and
initiatives with the Adarand standards and principles.
III. FEDERAL AFFIRMATnE ACTION PROGRAMS
A. Programs in Existence Pre-Adarand
As Justice O'Connor indicated in Adarand, affirmative action
programs in federal government contracting "implicate a complex
scheme of federal statutes and regulations.""' Many of these
regulations now must be re-evaluated in light of the Court's Adarand
decision. Some of these statutes and regulations are discussed below.
1. Executive Order 11,246
Issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965, Executive Order
No. 11,246 ("Executive Order 11,246") requires federal contractors
and subcontractors to include in each government contract a
provision stating that the contractor will "take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated
during employment, without regard to race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."" 2
Under Executive Order 11,246, employers who do business with the
federal government under contracts or subcontracts in excess of
$10,000 are required to comply with regulations promulgated by the
110. Id. at 2118-19 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State... deny to any person"
equal protection of law); id, amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting abandonment of voting right on
account of race).
111. SeeAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (noting that use of subcontractor compensation schemes
implicates numerous "complex regulatory schemes").
112. Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1994) [hereinafter Exec. Order 11,246].
1996] 1917
THE AMERICAN UNIERSriy LAw REVIEW [Vol. 45:1903
Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Executive Order."8 Section 202
of Executive Order 11,246 requires employers to: (1) not discrimi-
nate in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; (2) take affirmative action to protect applicants and
employees from such discrimination; (3) post conspicuously govern-
ment-supplied notices containing the provisions of the clause; (4)
state in all advertising that applicants will be considered without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (5) send
notices to appropriate labor unions advising them of the contractor's
commitments under the Executive Order, and post copies of these
notices; (6) furnish any material required under the order or
regulations, and allow access to this material if the employer's
compliance with the regulations is under investigation; (7) allow
cancellation or suspension of the contract, debarment, or other
sanctions if the employer does not comply with the rules; and (8)
include the clause in all subcontracts and enforce it, unless exempt-
ed." 4
Contractors or subcontractors with fifty or more employees and
contracts with the federal government worth $50,000 or more are
required under the order to prepare and maintain affirmative action
plans."' Further, a government contractor must file EEO-1 reports
within thirty days of the awarding of its first government contract and
must file an annual EEO-1 report on or before March 31 of each
subsequent year." 6
Executive Order 11,246 is enforced by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP")."" OFCCP conducts
periodic reviews and investigates complaints to ensure compliance
with the requirements of the order.' OFCCP first attempts to
113. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(a) (1995) (requiring that contracting agencies include equal
opportunity clause from Executive Order 11,246, "except as otherwise provided"). Transactions
of $10,000 or less are exempted. Id. § 60-1.5(a).
114. Id. § 60-1.4(a).
115. See i&. § 60-2.1 (setting out purpose and scope of affirmative action compliance
program).
116. Id. § 60-1.7(a) (1), (2). EEO-1 reports are promulgatedjointly by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Plans for
Progress. Id. § 60-1.7(a)(1).
117. See id. § 60-1.2 (delegating authority and assigning responsibility for implementing order
to director). The "director" referred to in the code is the director of the Office of Federal
Compliance Programs, the Department of Labor, or anyone to whom the director delegates
authority. Id. § 60-1.3.
118. See i&. § 60-1.20(a) (describing compliance reviews as entailing "a comprehensive
analysis and evaluation of each aspect of the aforementioned practices, policies, and conditions"
of nondiscriminatory and affirmative action programs).
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resolve disputed issues through conciliation or a hearing;"1 if this
attempt fails, the order authorizes the Secretary of Labor to make the
names of non-compliant contractors or unions public, to recommend
enforcement actions or criminal proceedings if false information is
produced, to cancel or suspend the contract, or to debar the
contractor.
120
2. Small disadvantaged business subcontracting
a. Federal Acquisition Regulation
The policy to provide small business concerns and SDB concerns
the opportunity to participate in federal contracts is set forth in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR").2 SDBs are defined as
small business concerns which are: (1) at least fifty-one percent
unconditionally owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals, or an economically disadvantaged Indian
tribe or Native Hawaiian Organization, or at least fifty-one percent of
the stock of a publicly owned business is unconditionally owned by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, an economically
disadvantaged Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian Organization; and (2)
regularly managed and operated by one or more of such individu-
als. 2  The policy guidelines encourage prime contractors to carry
out the policy in the awarding of subcontracts and to establish
procedures to ensure timely payments pursuant to the terms of their
subcontracts."5 Prime contractors must submit a subcontracting
plan for small businesses and SDBs setting forth contracting goals to
the contracting officer 2 1 on contracts over $500,000 ($1,000,000 for
construction contracts). 2 5
119. See id. § 60-1.20(b) ("Where deficiencies are found to exist [via compliance review],
reasonable efforts shall be made to secure compliance through conciliation and persuasion.").
120. Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 112, § 209(a) (describing sanctions that Secretary of
Labor may impose); see 41 G.F.R. § 60-1.26 (1995) (enabling director of OFCCP to institute
administrative enforcement proceedings to force compliance or sanctions or both).
121. See Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-8(a) (1995) ("It is the
policy of the United States that small business concerns, small business concerns owned by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and small business concerns owned and
controlled by women shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in [federal
contracts].").
122. Id § 52.219-8(c).
123. See id. § 52.219-8(a) (stating policy of timely payments for SDB subcontracts); id.
§ 52.219-8(b) (obligating contractor to award subcontracts according to government policy "to
the fullest extent consistent with efficient contract performance").
124. See id. § 52.219-9(c), () (1) (requiring prime contractor to submit contracting plan that
includes goals for use of SDBs in terms of percentages of total planned subcontracting dollars).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (4) (1994) (stating that solicitation for federal contracts meeting
certain threshold requirements must be awarded pursuant to subcontracting plan).
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b. Minority business enterprise prime contracts-the 8(a) Program
Section 8 (a) of the Small Business Act establishes the government's
8(a) Program for small disadvantaged businesses.1 26 Under this
program, agencies enter into various contracts with the SBA to
perform work. 27 The SBA then in turn contracts the work to con-
tractors that are owned and operated by persons presumed or found
to be economically and socially disadvantaged. 2  Historically,
socially disadvantaged individuals have included African Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Eskimos, Asian Pacific
Americans, Subcontinental Asian Americans, and certain other
minority group members. 29 The 8(a) Program is designed to open
participation in government contracting to minority business
enterprises.2 0 To be considered eligible, the enterprise must be
owned and managed by a member of a socially and economically
disadvantaged group and be certified by the SBA for participation in
the 8(a) Program.' 3 '
The SBA is authorized to enter into contracts with federal agencies
and to subcontract performance of those contracts to small, socially
and economically disadvantaged businesses.12  The Department of
Defense ("DOD") participates in this program by offering require-
ments to the SBA for subcontracting with firms approved by the SBA
for participation in its 8(a) Program.13 3
c. Department of Defense SDB evaluation preferences
Under the Department of Defense's section 1207 Program, DOD
has established a five percent-per-year contracting goal for SDBs,
126. Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 8(a), 72 Stat. 384, 389 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(a)).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1) (allowing SBA to enter into contracts with government
department or agency to provide goods, equipment, or services).
128. See id. § 637(a) (1) (B) (empowering SBA to "arrange for the performance of such
procurement contracts by negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts to socially and
economically disadvantaged small business concerns ... as may be necessary to enable the
Administration to perform such contracts").
129. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(a) (1995) (defining socially disadvantaged individuals as "those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identities
as members of groups without regard to their individual qualities").
130. See id. § 124.1(a) (1) (indicating that 8(a) program is intended to be used exclusively
for business development purposes and to help socially and economically disadvantaged small
businesses).
131. See id. §§ 124.100-.109 (setting forth eligibility requirements).
132. Mi. § 124.1(b).
133. See Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement ("DFARS"), 48
C.F.R. §§ 219.803, .804, .804-1 (1995) (providing for SBA's 8(a) program in Department of
Defense procurements).
1920
1996] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFMER ADARAND 1921
historically black colleges and universities, and other minority
institutions."M In connection with this, DOD also has created a SDB
program, which gives an evaluation cost factor, or advantage, of up to
ten percent on unrestricted procurements,135 and provides special
technical assistance to SDBs.13 6
The Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement ("DFARS"), provides that SDBs may be eligible for an
evaluative preference in defense procurements.1"7 Small disadvan-
taged businesses obtain an evaluation preference of up to ten percent
of the price bid, and this factor may be applied line item by line item
if the award can be made in that manner.1l 8
d. Department of Transportation SDB programs
The DOT's MBE program was the program at issue in Adarand 39
Under this program, the federal government authorizes the use of
subcontractor compensation bonuses to prime contractors who use
SDBs.' ° The payment is intended to be rough compensation for
the prime contractor's expense in monitoring SDBs and providing
technical assistance. 4'
The Surface Transportation Assistance Act, now the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act ("ISTEA"), 142 is the key
program used by DOT for affirmative action. 43 ISTEA requires that
ten percent of transportation contracts be allocated to DBEs, unless
134. Id § 219.000. This part of the DFARS implements 10 U.S.C. § 2323, which sets a goal
for the DOD from fiscal years 1987 through 2000. Id.
135. See id. § 219.70 (setting out evaluation preference program for SDBs).
136. See id § 209.201 (stating general policy of DOD program, which includes technical
assistance as way of reaching 5% goal for contract and subcontract awards to SDBs).
137. See i&. (listing evaluation preference as possible means to reaching DFARS 5%-per-year
contracting goal).
138. See id. § 219.7002 (setting forth procedures for evaluating preferences for SDB
concerns).
139. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (1995) (discussing DOT
regulations).
140. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 23.41-.55 (1995) (delineating elements of DOT financial assistance
programs).
141. See id § 23.45 (setting forth components of MBE program). Recipients of DOT
financial assistance must develop a policy statement manifesting a commitment to objectives,
such as the following: maximum possible use of MBEs; designation of a liaison officer and
support staff to administer the program; establishment of procedures to give MBEs the
opportunity to compete for contracts or subcontracts; and creation of opportunities for the use
of banks owned and controlled by minorities. Id. Furthermore, the DOT requires an extensive
system of record keeping. See id § 23.49.
142. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of titles 23, 49, and other titles of U.S.C.).
143. See 49 C.FR pt. 23 subpt. d (1995) (implementing Surface Transportation and Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act).
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the Secretary of Transportation determines otherwise.144  The
Airport & Airways Improvement Act offers a similar DBE require-
ment.145
3. Preferences for Native American-owned businesses
Native Americans are presumed by SBA regulations to be socially
disadvantaged, a prerequisite for participation in the 8(a) Pro-
gram. 146 Native Americans also qualify for the minority subcontract-
ing programs set forth in FAR Part 19.7.147
In addition to the 8(a) and FAR Programs described above, there
are several provisions in federal statutes and regulations which express
a preference for doing business with Native Americans and Native
American-owned businesses. Under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act:148
Any contract, subcontract, grant, or subgrant pursuant to this Act
... or any other Act authorizing Federal contracts with or grants to
Indian organizations or for the benefit of Indians, shall require that
to the greatest extent feasible ... preference in the award of
subcontracts in connection with the administration of such
contracts or grants shall be given to Indian organizations and to
Indian-owned economic enterprises. 49
Section 1452 of title 25 defines Indian-owned economic enterprises as
"any Indian-owned (as defined by the Secretary of the Interior)
commercial, industrial, or business activity established or organized
for the purpose of profit: Provided, That such Indian ownership shall
constitute not less than 51 per centum of the enterprise."' By the
Act's express terms, however, this preference for Native Americans
applies only to individuals who are members of an Indian tribe. 1'
Thus, Indian ancestry alone appears not to be sufficient for participa-
tion.
Another program, the Indian Incentive Program,'52 allows addi-
tional compensation to federal contractors in an amount equal to five
144. Id. § 23.61(a).
145. See id. (explaining that provisions apply to both DOT's MBE program and ISTEA).
146. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b) (1995) (delineating groups presumed to be socially
disadvantaged for purposes of 8(a) program).
147. See 48 C.F.R. § 19.703(b) (1995) (defining eligibility requirements for participation in
program).
148. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458hh (1994).
149. lId § 450e(b).
150. Id. § 1452(e).
151. Id. § 1452(b) (1994) (defining "Indian" as "any person who is a member of any Indian
tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community as recognized by the federal government as eligible
for services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs").
152. 48 C.F.RL subpt. 26.1 (1995).
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percent of its subcontractors' cost for those subcontractors which are
Native American-owned.15
Last, the Buy Indian Ace' provides that "[s]o far as may be
practicable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the
products (including, but not limited to printing, notwithstanding any
law) of Indian industry may be made in open market in the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior.
155
4. Mentor-protege program
Pursuant to section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991,156 DOD established a pilot program known as
the "Mentor-Protege Program." 157 The program's purpose is to
provide incentives for major DOD contractors to assist SDBs to
enhance their capabilities as subcontractors or suppliers, and to
increase SDBs' involvement in government contracts. 58 The large
business is designated as "mentor" and the SDB as "protege."5 9
A firm must be awarded DOD contracts and subcontracts of $100
million or more during the prior fiscal year or meet criteria to be
specified in regulations to be considered a mentor." An SDB must
be currently eligible for award of a government contract to be a
protege.' Unlike other SDB assistance programs, the protege firm
retains its eligibility for this program until it grows to twice the size
limitation of a small business. 62
5. Women-owned businesses
According to the White House's July 19, 1995, Affirmative Action
Review, women-owned businesses represented only 0.6% of DOD
153. See id. (implementing 25 U.S.C. § 1544).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 47.
155. Id.
156. Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 10 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
157. I& § 831; see 48 C.F.R. §§ 219.7100-.7105 (1995) (implementing mentor-protege
program).
158. 48 C.F.R. § 219.7100 (1995) (stating purpose of mentor-protege program as providing
incentives for DOD contractors to assist SDBs).
159. See id § 219.7102(a), (b) (defining mentor business as prime contractor with at least
one active subcontracting plan and protege business as SDB eligible to participate in federal
contracts).
160. National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 831(d),
104 Stat. 1485, 1608 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
161. I, § 831(c) (2).
162. Id. § 831(g) (4) (A) (limiting program eligibility to protege businesses which are no more
than two times maximum size determined by Small Business Administration to be SDB).
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prime awards in 1985 and a mere 1.7% in 1994.63 However, under
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ("FASA"), 1' a
government-wide goal for participation by small, women-owned
business enterprises ("WBE") was established "at not less than 5
percent of the total of all prime contract and subcontracts for each
fiscal year."'" As is evident from White House statistics, prior to
FASA, there had been no set-aside for government contracts for
WBEs. An economically disadvantaged woman, however, could have
attempted to qualify under the 8(a) Program' as socially disadvan-
taged because of gender.
167
FASA also added WBEs to the same level as SDBs." This means
that contractors are now required to negotiate a subcontracting plan
with specific small women-owned business goals.6 9 This subcon-
tracting plan must "separately" address women-owned small business-
es, and liquidated damages may be assessed for failure to make a
good faith effort to comply with the subcontracting plan.1
70
Prior to FASA's requirements, there were mere statements of policy
without numerical goals for WBEs. In 1979, Executive Order No.
12,138 established the National Women's Business Enterprise Policy,
which required agency personnel to strengthen WBEs.17 ' The
Office of Federal Procurement Policy ("OFPP") implemented this
policy by directing that the procurement regulations be changed to
encourage contractors to subcontract with women-owned business-
es. 172 Although OFPP never established formal goals, most recent
contracts for more than $10,000 have included a FAR clause encour-
aging contractors to subcontract to WBEs to the maximum extent
practicable.
163. George Stephanopoulos & Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Review. Report
to the President (July 19, 1995), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 139, S-1 (July 20, 1995)
(hereinafter Affirmative Action Review].
164. Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (1994) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
165. See id. § 7106(a) (2) (A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (1)).
166. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (describing eligibility requirements for
8(a) program).
167. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(c)(1)(i) (1995).
168. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 7106(a)(1), 108 Stat. 3243.
169. 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-9 (implemented by 60 Fed. Reg. 48,265 (1995)).
170. I& § 52.219-16.
171. Exec. Order No. 12,138, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (1979).
172. I& at 29,638.
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B. Changes and Proposed Changes Issued by the Federal Government in
the Wake ofAdarand
1. Department ofJustice proposed reforms
On June 28, 1995, Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger
issued a Memorandum to General Counsels ("Memorandum") that
provides guidelines for federal government agencies reviewing
affirmative action programs following Adarand1' The DOJ Memo-
randum stated that "Adarand makes it necessary to evaluate federal
programs that use race or ethnicity as a basis for decisionmaking to
determine if they comport with the strict scrutiny standard."'" The
Memorandum sets forth six factors that agencies must consider to
determine whether such programs pass the Adarand standard. These
factors are as follows: (1) whether the governmental entity consid-
ered race-neutral alternatives before implementing a "race-based
measure"; (2) whether the program includes a flexible waiver
mechanism for individualized consideration of a "particular minority
contractor's bid"; (3) whether the program makes race a requirement
for eligibility in the program or whether race is just one factor to be
considered; (4) what appropriate measure is chosen to numerically
compare the target to the number of minorities in the field; (5) the
duration of the program and whether it is subject to meaningful
periodic review; and (6) what degree and what type of burden is
imposed on people who do not belong to racial or ethnic groups.175
Under Adarand and these DOJ guidelines, agency programs that are
aimed at minorities must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.17 1 In the Memorandum, however, Assistant
Attorney General Dellinger implied that it may be possible to validate
federal government programs on the basis of national data, that is,
"Congress may be able to rely on national findings of discrimination
to justify remedial racial and ethnic classifications; it may not have to
173. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to General
Counsels (June 28, 1995), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 125, at E-1 (June 29, 1995)
[hereinafterjustice Dep't Memo].
174. See id. at E-11 (concluding that affirmative action programs should not be suspended
until reviewed for compliance with Adarand).
175. See id. at E-6 to E-9 (identifying factors used by courts to determine whether race-based
affirmative action program is narrowly tailored). The goal of the narrowly tailored test is to
ensure' that affirmative action is a "product of careful deliberation and not hasty
decisionmaking." I&
176. I&
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base such measures on evidence of discrimination in every geographic
locale or sector of the economy that is affected."'
2. President Clinton's response to Adarand
a. The White House review
OnJuly 19, 1995, the Clinton Administration released the results of
a five-month review of existing affirmative action programs. 7 This
ninety-six page White House review recommended the following: (1)
creating a uniform certification process for all SDBs (conducted by
specially licensed private firms where possible); (2) tightening the
economic disadvantage test used to qualify for these programs, and
including in this measurement the value of the owner's personal
residence and the spouse's assets; (3) applying the 8(a) Program's 9-
year graduation limit to all SDB programs; (4) developing objective
industry-specific criteria for determining when firms are no longer in
need of set-asides; (5) placing caps on the dollar value of contracts,
as well as caps on total dollars a firm can receive through set-asides;
(6) increasing penalties against "front" companies; and (7) establish-
ing measures to ensure that programs terminate when the affirmative
action goals have been met1 9 The report also noted that, although
women-owned businesses now receive less than two percent of
government contracts, women own one-third of all businesses. 8 As
a result of this disparity, the Clinton Administration currently is
determining if women-owned business should be made a presumed
disadvantaged group.'8'
b. The President's directive
On July 19, 1995, President Clinton responded to Adarand by
issuing a memorandum to the heads of all federal agencies mandating
that an affirmative action program must be eliminated or reformed
if it: (1) creates a quota; (2) creates a preference for unqualified
177. See id at E-1 (discussing possible differences in application of strict scrutiny standard
in federal government affirmative action programs as compared to state and local government
programs.
178. Affirmative Action Review, supra note 163, at S-1.
179. Affirmative Action Review, supra note 163, at S-42 (suggesting reforms to federal
procurement practices and policies).
180. See Affirmative Action Review, supra note 163, at S-36 (presenting statistical evidence
indicating that women owned 29.5% of all businesses in 1987 while federal procurement from
women-owned firms totalled only 1.6% or $2.9 billion in fiscal year 1992).
181. Women Could Eventually Belncluded in Set-Asides, Set-AsideAlert, SMALL BUSINESS PRESS,July
31, 1995, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IAGNWS File.
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individuals; (3) creates reverse discrimination; or (4) continues after
its equal opportunity purposes have been achieved.8 2
3. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
The FASA was enacted prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Adarand, so the act was not a legislative response to the ruling. Under
FASA, the Department of Defense's section 1207 Program for SDBs
was extended to include the entire government, including civilian
agencies.183 FASA also established a five percent SDB set-aside goal
for the Department of Defense, NASA, and the Coast Guard."8 The
program also established a separate five-percent goal for women-
owned businesses, the first time numerical goals were established by
statute." FASA also calls for development of uniform definitions
of small business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned
business for all federal government agencies."8 6 OFCCP Deputy
Administrator William Coleman has stated that an on-going review by
the DOJ has "prompted consideration ... of a combined SDB and
women-owned business definition."187
4. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
On August 2, 1995, OFCCP issued a notice defending its affirmative
action policies under Executive Order 11,246 and Adarand.1'
Entitled OFCCP Notice Reaffirming Affirmative Action Goals in Light of
Adarand Decision, Administration Review, this notice emphasized:
[The OFCCP] reaffirms [its] longstanding policy... that affirma-
tive action program goals under Executive Order 11,246 are to be
used as a tool to aid in breaking down barriers to equal employ-
ment opportunity for women and minorities without impinging on
the rights and expectations of other members of the workforce.
Affirmative action program goals are not to be used as quotas which
must be achieved through race-based and gender-based preferenc-
es.
189
182. White House Memo, supra note 67, at S-42; see also President's Remarks, supra note 67.
183. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 7105, 108 Stat. 3369 (1996) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2323
(1994)).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 7106(a) (2) (A), 108 Stat. 3367 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1994)).
186. Id. § 7107, 108 Stat. 3376 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 405 (1994)).
187. Women Could Eventually Be Included in Set-Asides, supra note 181.
188. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, U.S. Dep't Labor Employment
Standards Administration, OFCOP Notice Reaffirming Affirmative Action Goals in Light of
Adarand Decision, Administration Review (Aug. 2,1995), reprinted inDAItY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.
155, at E-1 (Aug. 11, 1995) [hereinafter OFOOP NOTICE].
189. Id. at E-.
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Moreover, OFCCP asserted that its "use of numerical goals in
affirmative action programs under Executive Order 11,246 meets the
standards of fairness"1" put forth by President Clinton in his
Affirmative Action Speech of July 19, 1995.191 Most striking, howev-
er, was the OFCGP's insistence that Adarand did not affect its use of
numerical goals. The OFCGP stated:
Adarand established the judicial standard of review applicable to
governmental programs that use racial and ethnic classifications as
a basis for decisionmaking. Because the Executive Order program
does not require decisionmaking based on race or ethnicity, the
standards established in Adarand do not apply to the use of goals in
Executive Order 11,246 affirmative action programs. 9
According to OFCCP, the essence of affirmative action programs is
the procedure under which federal contractors "analyze their
workforce and evaluate their employment practices for the purpose
of identifying and correcting any unlawful race-based and sex-based
obstacles to equal employment opportunity." 193 But, OFCCP avers,
the numerical goals that are set up to correct disparities are "not
designed to be... quotas with respect to persons of any race, color,
religion, sex or national origin," because the regulations prohibit
this."9  "Rather, the goal-setting process in affirmative action
planning is used to target and measure the effectiveness of affirmative
action efforts to eradicate and prevent discrimination."' 95
OFCCP mandates that an employer is not required to do the
following: "1) hire a person who does not have the qualifications
needed to perform thejob successfully; 2) hire an unqualified person
in preference to another applicant who is qualified; or 3) hire a less
qualified person in preference to a more qualified person."196 This
is because "[u]nlike preferences and quotas, numerical goals
recognize that persons are to be judged on individual ability, and are,
therefore, consistent with the principles of merit hiring and promo-
tion."19 7
Most importantly, OFCCP promises:
190. Id.
191. See President's Remarks, supra note 67 (articulating standards of fairness as consisting
of no quotas in theory or in practice; no illegal discrimination of any kind, including reverse
discrimination; no preferences for anyjob or opportunity for people who are not qualified; and
retirement of program after fulfillment of its goals).
192. OFCCP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-1.
193. OFCGP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-1.
194. OFGGP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-2.
195. OFCCP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-2.
196. OFCCP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-2.
197. OFCGP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-2.
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A contractor's compliance is measured by whether it has made
good faith efforts to meet its goals. Failure to meet goals is not a
violation of the Executive Order. Therefore, a contractor that has
not met its goals will be found in compliance if it has made good
faith efforts.198
The OFCCP notice announced it was merely reaffirming its existing
interpretation and policy rather than changing it in light of
Adarand.199 Enforcement by OFCCP compliance officials "on the
ground," however, frequently had gone beyond the passive official
policy. The Administrator's reiteration of OFCCP's non-quota policy
should be helpful in reining in overzealous interpretation and
enforcement.
5. Department of Defense's response to Adarand
a. Suspension of the "Rule of Two" Program
On October 23, 1995, in the wake of the DOJ's government-wide
review of all federal agencies' affirmative action plans, DOD issued a
memorandum suspending the use of the "rule of two" set-aside policy
for small disadvantaged businesses.00 Under the rule of two, if two
or more SDBs were available and qualified to bid for a DOD prime
contract, then that contract had to be set-aside for SDBs, provided
that the SDB price was not more than ten percent above the fair
market price.20  The use of the "rule of two" was part of DOD's
attempt to comply with the section 120702 goal of awarding five
percent of its contracts and subcontracts to SDB firms, historically
black colleges and universities and other minority institutions.20 3
From the rule's promulgation in 198724 through the first three
quarters of 1995, DOD had awarded $5.4 billion worth of prime
198. OFCCP NOTiCE, supra note 188, at E-2.
199. See OFCCP NOTICE, supra note 188, at E-2 (indicating that notice was issued to reaffirm
OFCCP's policy on affirmative action goals).
200. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,954 (Oct. 27,
1995) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 219, 252) (ordering suspension of SDB set-asides to be
effective October 23, 1995).
201. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1207, 100
Stat. 3816, 3973-74 (1986) (codified as amended 10 U.S.C. § 2301 note (1994)).
202. I., 100 Stat. at 3973.
203. Id.
204. Id,, 100 Stat. at 3974.
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contracts under section 1207. °5 Of the $5.4 billion, $516 million
worth of contracts were awarded under the rule of two program. 6
The DOD memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense
John White stated that the suspension of the "rule of two" did not
"reflect any change in the Department's commitment to bring SDBs
into the defense industrial base."20 7
b. Defense Acquisition Regulation changes
On December 14, 1995, DOD proposed four Department of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation ("DFAR") rule changes that
addressed monitoring of SDB subcontracting plans, evaluation
preferences, and use of the ten percent price-preference pro-
gram.20 8 Under the ten percent price-preference program, DOD
may, if the SDB bidding on the contract requests it, add ten percent
to the bid price of an offeror that is not an SDB firm."°
c. New DOD regulations
Two months after suspension of its rule of two program, DOD
announced a new program for small disadvantaged businesses.210
This program, titled "The Industry Thrust Program," will provide
information on DOD contract and subcontract possibilities for
minorities. This new program will be aimed at the same audience
that the "rule of two" addressed: SDBs, women-owned businesses,
historically black colleges and universities, and minority institu-
tions.2  Initially, the program will target environmental, manufac-
turing, health care, telecommunications, and management informa-
tion systems companies.1 2
6. The New Justice Department Proposed Reforms
On May 23, 1996, the DOJ issued a long-awaited set of "Proposed
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement" ("Proposed
Reforms") for the purpose of reforming federal government affirma-
205. DOD Suspends Minority Set-Aside Program, DEF. DAiLY, Oct. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, DEFDLY File (providing dollar statistics of contracts awarded through rule of two
program).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 60 Fed. Reg. 64,135 (Dec. 14, 1995) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 215, 219, 236, 242,
252, 253).
209. Id. at 64,137.
210. DOD Announces New ProgramforSDBs, 65 FED. CoNT. REP. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 22, 1996).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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tive action programs to ensure constitutional compliance with the
strict scrutiny standards set out in AdarandY18
In the Proposed Reforms, DOJ states that recent congressional
action, meaning FASA,21 4 which extended authority to most federal
agencies "to conduct various race-conscious activities," is "credible and
constitutionally defensible" because it is backed by persuasive evidence
that without some sort of affirmative action "federal contracting would
unquestionably reflect the continuing impact of discrimination that
has persisted over an extended period."" 5 Some of the evidence
cited by DOJ includes the numerous Croson studies of discrimination
that have been performed by state and local governments in the past
several years. Citing the extension by Congress of affirmative action
authority to all federal agencies through FASA, the Proposed Reforms
state that regulations implementing this extension have been delayed
because of Adarand, but that the Proposed Reforms are intended to
provide a basis for the new regulations.216
The Proposed Reforms emphasize that the 8(a) program "merits
special mention at the outset."21 1 It then goes on to draw a distinc-
tion between the 8(a) program and general SDB programs. For
example, as opposed to the general SDB program, the 8(a) program
"is designed to assist the development of businesses owned by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals."218 The general SDB
program, however, is a "procurement program, designed to assist the
government in finding firms capable of providing needed services,
while at the same time, helping to address the traditional exclusion
of minority-owned firms from contracting opportunities."219
To strengthen the 8 (a) program, the Proposed Reforms set out five
major areas in which measures will be implemented intended to
strengthen "safeguards against fraud and to ensure that the 8(a)
program serves its purpose in assisting the development of businesses
owned by individuals who are socially and economically disadvan-
taged."22°  These areas are: (1) eligibility and certification; (2)
benchmark limitations; (3) mechanisms for increasing minority
213. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042 (May 23, 1996).
214. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 7102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 644 note (1994)).
215. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,042 (May 23, 1996).
216. Id.
217. 1& at 26,043.
218. I& at 26,042.
219. id at 26,043.
220. Id
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opportunity; (4) the interaction of benchmark limitations and
mechanisms; and (5) outreach and technical assistance.221
First, under "Eligibility and Certification," the Proposed Reforms
state that in a reformed certification process, "[e] ach bid that an SDB
submits to an agency, or to a prime contractor seeking to fulfill 8 (d)
subcontracting obligations, will have to be accompanied by a form
certifying that the concern qualifies as a small disadvantaged business
under eligibility standards that will be published by the SBA."
222
Although this certification process changes the method now being
utilized, the Proposed Reforms state that "[m] embers of designated
minority groups seeking to participate in SDB and 8 (d) programs will
continue to fall within the statutorily mandated presumption of social
and economic disadvantage. This presumption is rebuttable as to
both forms of disadvantage."
23
Second, in the section entitled "Benchmark Limits," the Proposed
Reforms state that "[a]lthough Congress has made the judgment that
affirmative race-conscious measures are needed in federal contracting,
the use of race must be narrowly tailored."224  Consequently, the
Proposed Reforms call for a "set of specific guidelines to limit, where
appropriate, the use of race-conscious measures in specific areas of
federal procurement."2  And, the Proposed Reforms promise that
"limits, or 'benchmarks,' will be set for each industry for the entire
Government."
226
Third, in the section entitled "Mechanisms for Increasing Minority
Opportunity," the Proposed Reforms assert that "[u]nder the
reformed structure, the federal government will generally have
authority... to use several race-conscious contracting mechanisms:
SBA's 8(a) program; a bidding credit for SDB prime contractors; and
an evaluation credit for non-minority prime contractors that use SDBs
in subcontracting. '227  In addition, the Government will have a
variety of outreach programs to provide more contracting opportuni-
ties for SDBs. Thus, the three "mechanisms" for affirmative action in
the DOJ Proposed Reforms are the three majority existing affirmative
action programs-8(a) sole-source contracting, bid evaluation factors
up to ten percent for SDB prime contractors, and evaluation
incentives for non-SDB prime contractors to contract to SDBs.
221. Id.
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Id. at 26,045.
225. Id.
226. Id
227. Id. at 26,046.
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Fourth, in the section entitled "Interaction of Benchmark Limits
and Mechanisms," the Proposed Reforms established:
In determining how benchmark limitations will be used to measure
the appropriateness of various forms of race-conscious contracting,
the objective has been to develop a system that can operate with a
sufficient degree of clarity, consistency and simplicity over the range
of federal agencies and contracting activities. Where the use of all
available tools, including direct competition and race-neutral
outreach and recruitment efforts, results in minority participation
below the benchmark, race-based mechanisms will remain avail-
able.228
The Proposed Reforms then state:
Data regarding minority participation will be reviewed annually, but
will include the past three fiscal years of experience. Examining
experience over three year stretches should produce a more
accurate picture of minority participation, given short-term
fluctuations and the fact that the process of bidding and awarding
a contract may span more than a single fiscal year.2"
Finally, in the section entitled "Outreach and Technical Assistance,"
the Proposed Reforms state that the activities that agencies now use
to "make minority firms aware of contracting opportunities" will
continue but that "race-conscious measures [should] be used only to
the minimum extent necessary to achieve legitimate objectives."2"0
The Proposed Reforms set out a partial list of nine suggestions as to
how agencies may achieve race-neutral outreach and technical
assistance programs that encourage minority participation in outreach
and technical assistance programs.23 1
Although it took almost a year to formulate its proposals, DOJ has,
in the opinion of the authors, made a serious, good faith and logical
effort to meet the "narrow tailoring" prong of the "strict scrutiny"
standard. It also has purported to justify its programs under the
"compelling interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test. While the
narrow tailoring prong may well pass muster, the compelling interest
prong is far more difficult to demonstrate and far more vulnerable to
attack, in the authors' view, since it requires that present discrimina-
tion or current effects of past discrimination be demonstrated
throughout the nationwide market in which the federal government
procures its goods and services.
228. Id.
229. I& at 26,047.
230. I& at 26,048.
231. Id at 26,049.
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Z Proposed legislation
a. The Equal Opportunity Act of 1995
The Equal Opportunity Act of 1995,2"' sponsored by then-Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and Representative Charles
Canady (R-Fla.)283 proposed the elimination of all preferential
programs in the federal government, including the present obliga-
tions of federal agencies to set "goals and timetables" for hiring
minorities and women.2" The bill would prohibit the "use of a
quota, set-aside, numerical goal, timetable, or other numerical
objective," 5 as well as any preference "based in whole or in part on
race, color, national origin, or sex."2" Instead the bill would
require a review of existing policies and regulations by every federal
agency within one year of enactment, and modification of all policies
and regulations in accordance with the requirements of the act.2"7
The bill did provide exemptions for historically black colleges, Indian
tribes, combat-related and national security functions, and bona fide
occupational qualifications based on sex.2" The bill also stated that
pending cases, contracts, subcontracts, or consent decrees that were
already in place at the time of the enactment of the bill or remedies
that were available under other federal laws or both, would not be
affected by the new law.2" 9 In addition, the bill proposed that there
be recruitment or encouragement of qualified women or minorities
for federal employment or for employment by federal contractors or
subcontractors, or for bidders on federal contracts "if such recruit-
ment or encouragement does not involve using a numerical objective,
or otherwise granting a preference." 240
232. S. 1085, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (hereinafter Senate Bill].
233. See 141 CONG. REC. S10,831 (daily ed. July 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bennett
congratulating Sen. Dole and Rep. Canady for introducing Employment Opportunity Act of
1995).
234. See Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 8 (stating that bill's purpose is to "prohibit discrimina-
tion and preferential treatment on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex with respect
to Federal employment, contracts, and programs").
235. See Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 8 (stating that definition of preferential treatment
encompasses quotas, set-asides, numerical goals, timetables, and other numerically-based
objectives).
236. Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 2.
237. Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 5.
238. Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 4 (providing list of institutions, groups, and government
policies exempt from bill).
239. Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 7.
240. Senate Bill, supra note 232, § 3.
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b. The Gramm Amendment
On July 20, 1995, Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) offered an amend-
ment that was promptly defeated by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-
six.241  This amendment would have prohibited the use of govern-
ment funds for any contract set-asides based on race, gender, or
national origin.24 Instead, the Senate adopted an amendment by
Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) prohibiting the use of funds for any
program that results in an award to an unqualified person, reverse
discrimination, or quotas, or is inconsistent with the decision in
Adarand.243
8. State government response
Adarand did not change the standard of review of state or local
affirmative action programs.2' However, following Adarand, no less
than twenty states have acted or intend to act to limit their affirmative
action policies, and sixteen have acted in support of their affirmative
action programs.21 For example, Oregon removed requirements
that bidders on state transportation contracts must hire a certain
percentage of minority and women owned businesses as subcontrac-
tors.2
46
9. Case law after Adarand
The case law following Adarand largely has involved procedural
issues, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v.
Texas.247 The latter decision dealt squarely with the substantive
application of the strict scrutiny standard to university admissions,
reversing the generally-understood, prevailing Supreme Court
precedent of Regents of University of California v. Bakke.2 s A discus-
sion of Hopwood and other significant cases follows.
241. SenateDefeats Attempt to Kill Minority Set-Asides, Set-Aside Alert, SMALL BUSINESS PRESS,July
31, 1995, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IAGNWS File.
242. Id.
243. 1I
244. See supra part II (discussing effect of Adarand decision on race-based affirmative action
programs in contracting).
245. State Legislatures Respond to Affirmative Action Uproar;, 20 States Aim to Limit Preferential
Policies, 16 to Strengthen, 33 GOV'T EMPL REL. REP. (BNA) 1052 (Aug. 14, 1995) (providing
overview of legislative activity regarding affirmative action in state hiring and contracting).
246. Thomas J. Madden & Kevin M. Kordziel, Strict Scrutiny and the Future of Federal
Procurement Set-Aside Programs in the Wake ofAdarand: Does 'Strict in Theory' Mean atal in Fact'?,
64 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 6 (Aug. 7, 1995).
247. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
248. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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a. Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission
In Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission,249 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a govern-
ment contract bidder had standing 50 to challenge the constitution-
ality of a California statute.251 The statute in question required
utility companies with gross revenues exceeding twenty-five million
dollars to submit annual business plans detailing how they would
increase the number of contracts with women-owned, minority-owned,
and disabled-veteran-owned business enterprises. These plans were
required to include "short- and long-term goals and timetables, but
not quotas, and ... methods for encouraging both prime contracts
and grantees to engage women, minority, and disabled veteran
business enterprises in subcontracts."25 2  Under the statute, the
Commission had the authority to sanction a utility for failing to make
acceptable progress in the hiring of minority businesses.5 8
Mr. Bras was a male architect who had provided services to Pacific
Bell for twenty-two years, from 1969 to 1991.254 In 1991, he was
asked to complete a prequalification criteria form, to be used by
Pacific Bell to select a group of architectural firms to submit proposals
and, if selected, to enter into "improved business partnerships. 255
One of the questions on the form asked if the applicant was currently
certified through the Cordoba Corporation Clearing House process
for minority/women business enterprise status. u6 Pacific Bell
awarded ten points for a "yes" answer and zero points for a "no"
answer.257  Bras answered "no" to the question and ranked sixth,
249. 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995), ceif. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996).
250. The three requirements for Article III standing are: (1) injury in fact, which means an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the
challenged conduct, which means that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action
of the defendant, and has not resulted from the independent action of some third party not
before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision,
which means that the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable
ruling is not too speculative. Bras v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869, 872 (1995)
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992)), cert. denied,. 116 S. Ct. 800
(1996).
251. See CAL PUB. UTnL CODE §§ 8281-8286 (West 1994) (providing preferences for women
and minority business enterprises regarding public utility procurement contracts).
252. Id. § 8283(b).
253. See id. § 8285 (providing sanctions for falsely representing business ownership as eligible
under code).
254. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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and thus was not selected to submit proposals.25 He was informed
by Pacific Bell that if he had answered "yes," he would have ranked
third.259
Bras brought a civil rights action against Pacific Bell and the
California Public Utilities Commission.2" He alleged that Pacific
Bell discriminated against him on the basis of race and sex in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause." He also challenged the
California Public Utilities Code and the Commission's General Order
on constitutional grounds, and asked for declaratory and permanent
injunctive relief forbidding the Commission from implementing the
law.262 Prior to trial, Bras settled with Pacific Bell, but proceeded
against the Commission.263 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed Bras' claim on summary
judgment for lack of standing.Y The Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded, finding that Bras had standing.2
The court first held that because Bras had settled with Pacific Bell
and thus only had asked for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Commission, he was required to show a very significant possibility
of future harm,26 not to demonstrate past injury.26 7 Bras satisfied
the injury-in-fact requirement with a showing that he was "able and
ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevent[ed
him] from doing so on an equal basis."2' The denial of equal
treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier erected by the
government is the injury in fact, not the future inability to obtain the
benefit.269 The fact that Bras would not be able to bid on another
contract with Pacific Bell for several years did not prevent the court
from finding that Bras met his burden of showing an "actual or
imminent" injury in fact 27
258. Id.
259. Id. The firm that finished third in the rankings was a minority-owned business. Id.
260. Id. Bras filed the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 872. Bras' remaining claims were for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Commission. Id.
264. Id. at 873.
265. Id. at 875-76.
266. Id. (citing Coral Constr. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 929 (9th Cir. 1991)).
267. Id. at 873.
268. Id. (quoting Northeastern Florida Contractors v. City ofJacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297,
2303 (1993)). The court found that although Pacific Bell had already entered into architectural
contracts, Bras could reapply when those existing contracts expired. Id.
269. Id. (citing Northemstern /orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2303).
270. Id. (holdingthat fact"[t]hat Bras can only compete for long-term contracts every several
years rather than on a project-by-project basis does not change the analysis").
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Second, the causal relationship prong was satisfied even though the
challenged regulation did not contain any race or gender specific
discriminatory devices.27' Statutes are not "immunized from scrutiny
because they purport to establish 'goals' rather than 'quotas."'272
The label attached to the program does not change the standing
analysis so long as the plaintiff can show that the ordinance's
discriminatory policy prevented him from competing on an equal
footing.27 Citing Adarand, as well as other authorities, the court
held that goals, not just rigid quotas, can cause such injury in fact.274
The court rejected the Commission's argument that the challenged
regulations did not require public utilities to adopt discriminatory
programs. 5 Rather, the practical effect of requiring the utilities to
apply the regulations was to require racial preferences. This message
sent by the regulations that racially-neutral outreach programs were
insufficient, created a sufficient nexus between Bras's injury and the
Commission's actions, and thus established a basis for an Equal
Protection Clause claim. 76
b. Challenges to the 8(a) Program
In C.S. McCrossan Construction Co. v. Cook,277 the United States
District Court of New Mexico denied a white-owned firm's challenge
to the constitutionality of the SBA's 8(a) Program. In this case,
McCrossan, a large contractor with revenues of $50 to $75 million in
1995, argued that the SDB set-aside contract at the U.S. Army's White
Sands Missile Range in New Mexico violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Previously, this contractor had
brought the same challenge in a bid protest to the General Account-
ing Office ("GAO")Y179 However, GAO declined to act on the
challenge.
As a general matter, GAO stated, it will not address constitutional
challenges to federal set-asides in the absence of clear judicial
271. Id. at 874-75.
272. Id at 874.
273. Id, at 874 ("We look to the economic realities of the program rather than the labels
attached to it.").
274. Id. at 875 (finding that "goal" or "quota" label attached to program does not affect
standing analysis).
275. Id (concluding that challenged regulations "effectively encourag(ed), if not
compel[led], Pacific Bell to adopt discriminatory programs").
276. Id.
277. C.S. McCrossan Constr. Co. v. Cook, No. 95-1345-HB, 1996 WL 310298 (D.N.M. Apr.
2, 1996).
278. Id. The claim arose from an indefinite delivery and indefinite quantity road and
pavement repair contract with an estimated value of between $150,000 and $35,000,000. Id.
279. C.S. McCrossan Constr. Co., B-259225, 95-1 C.P.D. I 146, 1995 WL 116790 (1995).
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precedent at the federal level. And further, stated GAO, it will not
regard Adarand as clear judicial precedent, because the Supreme
Court's action in the case was to remand to the lower courts for
review under the newly announced standard.28 Accordingly, the
GAO will not consider protests of government procurements based on
Adarand.81 The GAO thus denied McCrosson's initial bid pro-
test 82 because it is waiting for judicial precedent on the merits of a
case decided under the Adararnd strict scrutiny standard.283
The McCrossan court appears not to have provided such a precedent
in its decision. Although the court determined that McCrossan did
not lack standing under Adarand to challenge "the Government's
preferential treatment towards 8(a) program participants in the
bidding of the job order contract," it denied McCrossan's motion for
a preliminary injunction against the program.n In its ruling on the
denial, the court held that McCrossan had not demonstrated: (1)
that "it will suffer irreparable injury if the requested preliminary
injunction is not granted"; (2) that the balance of hardships favor
them; (3) that it would be in the public interest if such an injunction
were granted (indeed, the court held it would be against the public
interest); and (4) that there was "a substantial likelihood of [its]
prevailing on the merits."2
In 1996, at least three other government contractors brought
lawsuits, based on Adarand, challenging the constitutionality of the
8 (a) program. First, in Dynalantic Corp. v. United States, 8 a contrac-
tor challenged the government's decision to limit competition for a
helicopter simulator contract to 8(a) program participants. Calling
it unconstitutional, the contractor, Dynalantic Corp., asserted that
Adarand applied to this case since "the 8 (a) program is a 'race-based'
program that excludes Dynalantic from competing for the [present]
procurement solely on the basis of race."8 7 Dynalantic went on to
claim that "as race is allegedly the 'litmus test' under the 8(a)
280. Elrich Contracting, Inc., B-262015, 95-2 C.P.D. 1 71, 1995 WL 493491, at *1 (1995)
("The Court in Adarand simply announced the standard that is to be applied in determining the
constitutionality of such programs .... Thus whether any particular program is unconsti-
tutional was left to the lower federal courts to determine.").
281. Id. (declining to consider allegations in absence of clear precedent on point).
282. McCrossan, 1995 WL 116790 at *2 (1995) (citingJWA Sec. Servs., B-253836, 93-2 C.P.D.
219 (1993)).
283. See Elrich, 1995 WL 493491, at *1 (noting that Adarand did not provide precedent for
GAO to determine constitutionality of set-aside program).
284. I4
285. Id
286. Dynalantic Corp. v. United States, No. CIV. A. 95-2310(EGS), 1996 WL 475841, at *1
(D.D.C. May 20, 1996).
287. Id. at *3.
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program, any non-minority company-even a non-minority-owned
Fortune 500 company-has standing to attack the 8(a) program. ' a
The court, however, found that "for purposes of determining
standing, [Dynalantic's] characterization of the 8(a) program and its
efforts to elide [sic] addressing whether it satisfies the race-neutral
economic criteria, do not withstand scrutiny."
2 9
In determining that Dynalantic lacked standing to bring this
challenge, the court, however, did not rely on Adarand. Instead, it
relied on a 1974 Fifth Circuit case, Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v.
KlePpe,2 ° and identified the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as "the
only federal appellate court squarely to address the issue of the
standing of a party to challenge the constitutionality-on equal
protection grounds-of the 8(a) program."291
In Ray Baillie, the Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court's conclusion
that the 8(a) program was "unconstitutional because the primary
criterion for eligibility [in the program] is race, color, or ethnic
origin, and that the plaintiffs have been excluded from consideration
because of their race."292  Applying the Fifth Circuit's holding to
Dynalantic, the court ruled that Dynalantic lacked standing, stating:
[P]laintiffs have failed to meet... [the injury-in fact] requirement
with respect to the issue of the SBA's alleged discrimination in
administering the section 8(a) program. The plaintiffs never
applied for participation in the section 8(a) program. Further-
more, they do not even contend that they are socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged and therefore eligible for participation in the
program. Thus, whatever the outcome of the litigation, the
plaintiffs will not be directly affected.
Moreover, the court rejected Dynalantic's reliance on Adarand, stating:
Adarand... is distinguishable in three respects. First, Adarand did
not address the issue of standing with respect to a suit challenging
the constitutionality on equal protection grounds of the 8 (a)
program. Second, in Adarand, the non-minority plaintiff was
permitted to compete for the subcontract at issue.... Third, it is
unclear by what means the minority contractor that had been
288. Id
289. Id.
290. 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
291. Dynalantic, 1996 WL 475841, at *3.
292. Id. at *4 (quoting Ray Bailhie Trash Hauling Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 709 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. deni, 415 U.S. 914 (1974)).
293. Dynalantic, 1996 WL 475841, at *4 (quoting Ray Baillie, 477 F.2d at 710).
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awarded the subcontract at issue in Adarand, had been certified as
a socially and economically disadvantaged business.2
4
The court further distinguished Adarand, by stating:
While the record in Adarand does not disclose clearly that the
certification procedure utilized by that the certification procedure
utilized by that minority contractor lacked any race-neutral
assessment of an applicant's disadvantaged status as the Supreme
Court recognized in Adarand."5
In two other 1996 cases, SRS Technologies, Inc. v. United States,29
and Ellsworth Associates, Inc. v. United States,29 7 courts rejected consti-
tutional challenges brought by contractors against the 8(a) program.
In each case, the court found that the contractor lacked standing to
bring such an action.
In SRS, a minority-owned contractor claimed it had lost an award
for an 8(a) contract because of its lack of racial minority status.
Therefore, it argued, because awards of contracts under the 8(a)
program are based on race, Adarand demands that the program be
subjected to strict scrutiny. The court, however, dismissed the
challenge, pointing out that the contractor, SRS Technologies, Inc.,
lacked standing since its "injury," that is, the loss of the contract, was
not because of race, but because it was not economically disadvan-
taged. Indeed, the contractor had recently been decertified as an
SDB contractor by the SBA because the net worth of the owner of the
company was $3 million.2 9 8
Similarly, in Ellsworth Associates,21 a contractor challenged the 8 (a)
program as unconstitutional under the standard set in Adarand. In
this case, the court ruled that the contractor lacked standing because
it had participated in the 8 (a) program for the maximum amount of
time allowed under the regulation-nine years-and therefore was
ineligible to compete for 8(a) contracts. Thus the contractor could
show on injury since it had not lost the contract over race, but had
lost because of its ineligibility.
294. I. at *6 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104, 2118
(1995)).
295. Id at *7.
296. Civ. A. No. 95-1792-A (E.D. Virginia).
297. 926 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1996).
298. See SRS Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1995).
299. 926 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1996).
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c. Bid protests at the General Accounting Office
In PI Construction Corp.," a small disadvantaged business chal-
lenged the Secretary of Defense's suspension of certain set-aside
provisions of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supple-
ment in light of Adarand. °2  The challenge was based on the
grounds that proposals had been received. 3 The GAO dismissed
the protest, holding that a request for proposals can be amended at
any time prior to award.0 4 It did not reach the issue of whether, in
light of Adarand, set-aside provisions run afoul of equal protection
laws.3 05
In Advanced Engineering & Research Associates, Inc.,30 6 the GAO
refused to consider a protest based on the alleged unconstitutionality
of an Air Force SDB set-aside.'07 In Elrich Contracting, Inc.303 the
same was true of a challenge to a Department of Defense set-
aside.Stu In both cases, the GAO held that Adarand did not provide
the precedent for determining the constitutionality of set-aside
programs.3 1 ' Adarand, according to the GAO, merely announced
the standard that is to be applied in determining the constitutionality
of such programs, but did not decide whether these types of programs
are unconstitutional.311
d. The Hopwood case
In Hopwood v. Texas,"' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the University
of Texas School of Law ("the Law School") to discriminate in favor of
certain minorities, to the detriment of whites and "non-preferred"
minorities, with regard to the admission process.13 In deciding that
it did not, the court reviewed the process under the "strict scrutiny"
300. B-270576.2, 95-2 C.P.D. 1 270, 1995 WL 744792 (1995).
301. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
302. PI Constr. Corp., B-270576.2, 95-2 C.P.D. 1 270, 1995 WL 744792 (1995).
303. Id. at*1.
304. Id. at *2.
305. Id. at *1-2.
306. B-261377.2, B-261377.3, B-261377.4, 95-2 C.P.D. 156, 1995 WL 578227 (1995).
307. Advanced Eng'g & Research Assocs., B-261377.2, B-261377.3, B-261377.4, 95-2 C.P.D.
156, at 4 n.3, 1995 WL 578227, at *1 (1995).
308. B-262015, 95-1 C.P.D. 71, 1995 WL 493491 (1995).
309. Elrich Contracting, Inc., 5-262015,95-2 C.P.D. 71, at2, 1995 WL 493491, at*1 (1995).
310. Id.; Advanced Eng'g, 95-2 C.P.D. 156, at 4 n.3, 1995 WL 578227, at *1.
311. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text (explaining GAO's unwillingness to view
Adarand as clear judicial precedent regarding constitutionality of set-aside programs).
312. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
313. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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standard. 14 In holding against the Law School, the court stated
that, giving racial preferences to applicants for admission to the Law
School in order to achieve a goal of diversity in a student body, is not
sufficient to withstand "strict scrutiny." '
i. Facts of the case
In the admission process, the Law School used a formula entitled
the Texas Index ("TI").16 This TI was the composite of the under-
graduate GPA and the LSAT score for each applicant."7 Based
largely on these scores, applicants were ranked and placed into one
of three categories: "presumptive admit," "presumptive deny," or a
"discretionary zone."318  Aside from evaluation factors such as
undergraduate major, school attended, experiences and background
of the applicant, the Law School also evaluated applicants on the basis
of race.3 9 Specific minorities, Mexican-Americans and blacks, were
given preferential treatment. 2 ° In March 1992, the presumptive
admit score for whites and non-preferred minorities (Texas residents)
was 199, and that for minorities was 189.321 The presumptive denial
score for non-minorities was 192, while that for minorities was
179.2 In other words, a minority with a TI score of 189 would
almost definitely be admitted whereas a non-minority with this score
would almost definitely be rejected. More to the point, of the
applicants who fell within the 189-192 range, 100% of blacks, 90% of
Mexican-Americans, and 6% of whites were admitted."z
As well as lowering the standards of admission for blacks and
Mexican-Americans, the school also color-coded the application forms
according to race.3 24 In addition, non-minority applications were
reviewed in stacks of thirty, and each minority application was
reviewed individually.3" Furthermore, the school maintained
waiting lists which divided the applicants both by race and by
314. Id. at 938.
315. Id. at 944.
316. Id. at 935.
317. I.
318. Id
319. Id. at 937.
320. Id. at 938, 936.
321. Id. at 936.
322. Id,
323. Id at 937.
324. Id
325. Id. at 936.
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residence. 26 This permitted many of the minority students not
admitted to be placed on a "minority-only" waiting list. 27
All four plaintiffs in Hopwood applied for admission to the Law
School class entering in 1992.328 All four were considered to be in
the discretionary zone.129 Claiming injury, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the Law School under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed
derivative statutory violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200d ("Title
VI") .31 Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compen-
satory and punitive damages, the plaintiffs charged that they "were
subjected to unconstitutional racial discrimination."3 32
The Law School responded to these charges by arguing that the
admissions process was designed to meet the "aspiration" (or goal) of
having an entering class comprised of 10% Mexican Americans and
5% blacks.33
ii. Analysis
In ruling against the Law School, the Fifth Circuit refused to follow
the generally-held view of Justice Powell, writing for the plurality in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke.S" In Bakke, the Supreme
Court appeared to recognize that a university could legitimately assert
the desirability of a goal of a racially diverse student body." In its
rejection of Bakke, the Fifth Circuit relied on Croson for the proposi-
tion that
[a] bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justifications for such
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or
simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
"smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen
"fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
326. Id. at 938.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id
332. Id.
333. I& at 937.
334. Id. at 944.
335. Id, at 944-45.
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possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial .... ."'
Applying such a strict scrutiny standard, the Hopwood court held that
"any consideration of race or ethnicity by the Law School for the
purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment" 7 Indeed, the court
went on to say:
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves
a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more
rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the
physical size or blood type of the applicants. 38
Thus, the court concluded that "the use of ethnic diversity simply to
achieve racial heterogeneity" is unconstitutional. 39
The court, however, did not completely rule out the use of race in
the application process. For example, if individual, rather than
stereotyped qualities, are considered in obtaining a diverse student
body, then a state university may consider race in the application
process in the same way it would an applicant's ability to play an
instrument or to speak a foreign language.' The court noted that
it was rejecting, under the strict scrutiny standard, the assumption
that, by virtue of belonging to a specified racial group, an individual
will possess certain characteristics. 1 Indeed, the court noted that
"diversity" can come in many forms and that applicants must be
reviewed individually rather than by category of race in order to truly
promote diversity. 2
Unexpectedly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case on
July 1, 1996.1 Perhaps the Court was not yet ready to address the
issue of strict scrutiny in the context of educational institution
admissions.
IV. THE EFFECT ON THE FEDERAL CIRcurr
The docket of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit") will be significantly affected by the Adarand
decision. This is because the Federal Circuit is the appellate review
336. Id. at 940 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
337. Id. at 944.
338. Id. at 945.
339. Id at 946-47.
340. Id. at 945.
341. Id. at 946.
342. Id.
343. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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body for most federal government contract bid protests.?," Bid
protests may be filed with the GAO, the Court of Federal Claims, and
federal district courts.' " Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims
can be brought in the Federal Circuit. 6 Adverse decisions from
the GAO can be relitigated in the Court of Federal Claims prior to
award.'~7 In light of the GAO's determination not to regard Adarand
as a substantive judicial precedent,m government contractors who
wish to challenge race-based affirmative action programs will have to
do so in court. The anticipation is that much precedent will be made
by the Federal Circuit, which has the greatest expertise in government
contracts of any appellate court.
Until now, the Federal Circuit has not been faced with Adarand.type
issues, i.e., issues relating to the legality of SDB set-asides, 8(a) sole
source contract awards, and other race-based preferences. All of its
decisions to date which have involved SDB contracts pertained to
other issues, not whether the SDB set-aside or preference was
legal. 34
9
That will certainly change. The Supreme Court in Adarand has
made vulnerable all government SDB set-aside and preference
programs. Every procurement involving such a preference is a fair
target for litigation. Moreover, because the GAO has finessed the
decision-making on the legality of such preferences to the courts, all
challenges now must be made in court. The Court of Federal Claims
and the Federal Circuit are expected to be very busy with such cases
in the next few years.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Adarand dramatically altered the existing law
regarding federal affirmative action programs by changing the
standard of review of race-based affirmative action programs to that
of strict scrutiny. The Court, however, left it to the lower courts
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (giving Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over government
contract cases).
345. Id. § 1491; see Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 875 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
346. 28 U.S.C. § 798.
347. Id. § 2510.
348. See supra notes 286-97 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1080 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (holding that no implied contract existed where SBA regional administrator who approved
grant exceeded his authority); Centron Corp. v. United States, 585 F.2d 982, 985 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(finding that creditor did not acquire rights against SBA by informing SBA of its contractual
arrangements with 8(a) contractor or otherwise where 8(a) contracting assignment of portion
of contract proceeds to creditor did not satisfy Assignment of Claims Act of 1940).
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(including the Federal Circuit) to rule on the constitutionality of
individual programs.
The Justice Department, through its Proposed Reforms, has
attempted to reconcile Federal affirmative action programs with the
Adarand strict scrutiny standard and its prongs of "narrow tailoring"
of remedies to further a "compelling governmental interest."
The Justice Department has made a serious effort, which may be
sufficient, to bring the government's affirmative action programs in
government procurement under the "narrow tailoring" prong.
However, the biggest challenge facing the federal government is to
meet the "compelling governmental interest" prong, i.e., tojustify the
need for its affirmative action programs in the first place. How can
the federal government demonstrate the existence of prior racial
discrimination, the current effects of which justify the use of race-
based preferences today? Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Croson, various state and local governments have commissioned and
relied upon "Croson analyses," that is, studies tracking the historical
racial discrimination and current efforts justifying the government's
affirmative action program(s). These studies, by and large, have been
effective in establishing the factual predicate for the programs in
localities. It is a long way, however, from a study of a county or
school district to one covering the entire country. We believe that the
federal government will try to "piggy-back" onto the existing Croson
analyses around the country which have demonstrated the requisite
historical discrimination in many localities by either extrapolating
from them to the entire country or filling in the gaps through Croson
analyses of localities which have not yet been surveyed. Of course, the
federal government itself will have to independently review existing,
as well as new Croson analyses to determine that they demonstrate
present effects of past discrimination against a uniform standard of
acceptability. We believe that by establishing a percentage rate for
Croson analyses which demonstrate present effects of past discrimina-
tion as against those that do not, and factoring in the percentage of
the nation's population covered by Croson analyses, the federal
government can use statistics to extrapolate the existence of present
effects of past discrimination in the vast majority of the United States.
Whether the percentage of the country covered by Croson analyses and
the percentage of affirmative determinations of present effects of past
discrimination among the Croson analyses is sufficient to enable the
statistical extrapolation to the entire country is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, as additional Croson analyses are commissioned
and conducted, the percentage of the population covered will
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continue to grow. Thus, as cases challenging the factual underpin-
nings of federal affirmative action work their way up to the Supreme
Court, the statistical case will become stronger.
In any case, the next six months to a year will be very interesting.
